Exhibit 3
Multifamily Affordable Housing: What Works and What Doesn't
|
What works |
What doesn't work |
|
|
Delivering affordability |
Cheap rents with a clear bargain element |
High rent (which require support through income supplement) |
|
Income mixing |
Diverse range including many working families |
Income concentration below the jobs line (except elderly, who have retired) |
|
Compliance |
Outcome – measure results |
Process – measure procedures |
|
Federal involvement |
Wholesale – block-granted subject to state-by-state allocations, clear program goals and performance measures. |
Retail – details of individual properties prescribed within centralized legislative or regulatory rules. |
|
Resource allocation |
Closed-ended – resources awarded competitively |
Open-ended – no competition for resources |
|
Rent structures |
Formulas that self-adjust using external criteria (e.g. change in median income) |
Property-by-property calculations that require regulators to review annual budgets |
|
Debt service coverage |
125% or higher, so properties have cushions |
110% or lower, because properties have no cushions |
|
Cash flow limitations |
No caps, provided rents are affordable and property is in physical/ operational compliance |
Small distributions that eliminate cushions and create perverse incentives |
|
Ownership structures |
Private sector (for-profit or non-profit) with both profit motive and affordability mission |
Direct government ownership or disengaged ownership with neither experience nor exposure |
|
Assistance basing |
Property basing with strong compliance. Vouchers where there is ample supply. |
Property-based with no linkage to service quality. Vouchers with no reliable places to use them. |